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Abstract 
The paper discusses the importance of granularity in maintenance requirements. This becomes significantly important when investigating false 
alarms that cannot be verified, nor duplicated under typical inspections. Continuing advances in electromechanical systems, such as an 
aircraft’s fuel system, can frequently face a high number of No Fault Found (NFF) events due to design limitations associated with fault 
diagnosability. This work discusses such maintenance requirements whilst covering the human aspects of the design – involving stakeholders 
identification and presenting meaningful data identified from the requirements. Ideas to optimise system diagnostics (by using extra sensors) to 
recognise and reduce failure ambiguity groups are also discussed. This can help indicate how the most appropriate data can be selected to 
represent the aforementioned maintenance requirements, facilitate in trade-off analysis and making design decisions. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
For a physical system to be effective it has to be coherent. 
This indicates looking at the system as a “whole”, including 
its operating environment, behaviour and dependencies. The 
diffusion of availability based contracting within many 
industry sections has seen significant changes in how policy 
makers look at a “whole” system [1]. For example, with 
military aircrafts, regulatory authorities are modifying the way 
in which the defence industry operates due to the raising total 
cost of ownership. Consequently, the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) had published a strategy (called the Defence Industrial 
Strategy) – which highlighted defence requirements on third 
party partnerships and availability based contracting/package. 
[2]. Such contractual agreements help transfer risk in the total 
cost of ownership found within the supply chain – from the 
operator of the system, on to the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM). Such practices continue to drive 
requirements to support a cultural shift towards servitization, 
or in other words, availability based contracts. With such 
changing needs, a system that was originally designed to be 
coherent, may cease to be. Therefore, any such change must 
harmonize both the user of the system and OEM 
organization(s). This will further extend to include 
adjustments within the management of the transfer-of-
responsibility and supply chain. Even through notable 
advances have taken place, further adjustments continue, and 
hence delivering a service (maintaining system effectiveness) 
has become more important than the quality of service (system 
optimisation/efficiency).   
 
The aerospace industry needs to drive such changes in 
order to maintain availability expectations and to maximize a 
return on such agreements [3]. Some organisations have 
capitalized on this emerging cultural shift by investing to 
develop their global maintenance setup for their gas turbine 
solutions [4]. Their “whole” understanding of their systems 
has allowed them to make adjustments from system user 
training up to the sensors design for their products to capture 
system condition data. The aspirations are to enhance system 
reliability of the subsystem while facilitate the move towards 
condition based maintenance instead of opting for a reactive 
support regime. As a result, investment and research in health 
and usage monitoring systems has risen – to capture health 
information from various operating platforms. Traditionally, 
health management was not considered during the design 
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stages of electrical and mechanical systems. Systems were 
first developed and then the health monitoring strategies were 
considered by adding new sensors and/or tests as required. As 
both phases were done separately, addition of new sensors 
proved to be difficult due to design limitations. As the 
industry became aware of this gap, techniques that integrate 
the two design phases started to become more prominent. 
Here, the key factor to reduce maintenance overheads is the 
capture and analytics of the collected information for 
diagnostics (detection and isolation) and even prognostics 
(predicting failures). As a consequence to the apparent risk of 
bad sensor design and location, processing the wrong 
information (that is difficult to evaluate due to lack of 
resource), the challenge is in identifying and implementing a 
health management system for safety critical applications.   
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of 
organising relevant information according to maintenance 
requirements. This can help in improving system designs by 
keeping in mind the maintenance and availability aspirations 
of an organisation. The rest of the paper is structured as 
follows: the next section elaborates on the role of maintenance 
and why it is important to add granularity in its requirements. 
Section 3 makes use of a fuel system to add clarity to 
preceding discussion. Finally, some conclusions are 
summarised in Section 4. 
 
2. Maintenance Requirements 
Considering the increase in product-service type industry, 
the market for software tools (and related standards) to help 
with the design and specification of Health Management 
Systems (HMS) is growing. Khella et al. (2009) discussed a 
core gap whereby the principal health monitoring technology 
does not always meet the requirements of the maintenance 
specifications that would utilise the health information [5]. In 
order to address the issue, this paper makes use of an example 
fuel system to discuss the concept. While this study only 
considered a fuel system, there can be a range of interacting 
stakeholders (such as the system user, the operator, their 
maintenance technicians and engineers) that can provide a 
number of complex system requirements. For simplicity, the 
author only considers the maintenance engineer requirement 
i.e., to reduce the needless changes of Line Replaceable Units 
(LRU)*, referred to as the NFF phenomena [6,7,9]. This paper 
describes NFF as a measurable consequence of the diagnostic 
process, where the root cause of the reported fault was not 
verified. It should be noted that although this is not a 
complete requirement (as it does not mention the availability 
required, nor does it point towards any tolerance when 
addressing the NFF rate). Although, it does describe adequate 
detail to evaluate the concept. This requirement was selected 
due to its contradictory nature and “to show the value of the 
Systems Engineering approach embedded within the concept 
for resolving them” [6]. The contradiction (where the 
maintenance personnel would remove a suspected unit) 
manifests without additional fault investigations, in an attempt 
to increase availability/reliability and reduce maintenance 
downtime/costs. Such practice can cause many units to be 
sent back to the OEM as NFF – imposing a burden on 
reputation, maintenance costs, lost man-hours/resources, but 
ultimately reducing the LRU inventory available at the 
maintenance shop. On the other hand, to properly investigate 
and isolate the faulty unit (the root cause), the maintenance 
department may need more resources, time, cost and hence 
will reduce the system availability. In context to the scope of 
this paper, the requirement for the fuel system is to: isolate 
engine fuel system failures to one unit. This indicates an 
ambiguity group of one. 
 
Figure 1 shows an adaptation from [5] classifying the 
applicable data in three groups. The first group (visual) 
includes the human aspects; which involve the recognition of 
the main stakeholders within the system and their data needs 
to help them operate. The second group (transitional) covers 
the data requirements. This layer is also concerned with the 
data transformation that converts raw sensor data into 
meaningful information according to stakeholder 
requirements. The third group (hardware) represents the 
bottom layers of the figure, which are the physical (or 
hardware) elements. These encompass the various data 
formats available for processing and the raw sensor outputs.  
The transitional layer represents an essential part of the 
concept, as it describes the analytics required to gather health 
usage and monitoring data to be used for “diagnostics 
(detecting and isolating faults) or prognostics (predicting 
failures)” [6]. This layer is the core and should be designed by 




* An LR U  is a modular component designed to be 
replaced quickly from on-site inventory. Thus, restoring 
system availability, while the unserviceable LR U  is 
undergoing maintenance. 
Figure 1: The three layers for a maintenance requirement 
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2.1. False Alarms 
At this point in the paper, it is worth discussing some 
literature associated with false alarms. 
 
False alarms are major issues within maintenance for the 
stakeholders. Within the aerospace sector, research on such 
events has gained renewed interest in the past decade [6]. One 
significant example is the avionics components where this 
phenomenon reaches 85% of their failures and 90% of the 
total cost of maintenance [7]. Its effects are non-negligible 
because it impacts the system safety and dependability, so it is 
necessary to limit the consequences to satisfy stakeholders. 
This also demonstrates how an inconsequential event can 
build up into a strategic concern for organisations within their 
competitive environment. Currently, there is a drive towards a 
more electric aircraft, which indicates a rise in the number of 
false alarm reports [8]. When faults occur in a typical 
maintenance activity, maintenance personnel are called to find 
them. Procedurally, they rely on fault isolation manuals or 
manufacturer documents. If a component is not removed, then 
it is tagged serviceable. On the other hand, if the maintainer 
removes a component, it is sent to depth maintenance for 
further testing. At depth, if no fault is discovered, concerns 
are raised on why a serviceable component was removed from 
service. It is tagged as an NFF. There are three different 
scenarios which can explain unsuccessful fault diagnostics 
during the repair process: 
 
x The fault cannot be reproduced with the real 
conditions. The fault is hence considered as “one 
off” and the system is declared serviceable. 
However, the fault reappears later because the origin 
has not been identified.  
x The maintainer decides to replace a unit because he 
considers that it is the main fault’s root. After few 
tests on the new unit, the system is declared 
serviceable. Nevertheless, the fault reappears so the 
root was not clearly identified.  
x The same fault reoccurs, but the only difference is 
that the fault’s root was not in the unit replaced.  
 
The continuing evolution of electronic equipment and its 
increasingly dependency on built in tests (BITs) to provide 
health monitoring and error checking to find components (that 
need to be replaced), has become costly [6], “these BIT 
reports often result in unit replacements, recertification, or 
inevitable loss of availability of the equipment”. The design 
of system tests is a non-trivial task. This means that they rely 
on component interaction knowledge. As a consequence, it 
can be difficult to identify and assign a predetermined set of 
tests/checks that verify system functionality – leading to log 
false alarms. For example, when an operator reports a fault, 
these may not always correlate to the test reports. Despite 
modern component testability procedures, the problem of 
removed components that were reported by the BITs to be at 
fault, but bench testing reveals nothing. Furthermore, other 
factors such as limited test coverage and inappropriate 
tolerances, can also contribute to NFF events [7]. 
 
3. Concept Evaluation 
 
Evaluation of the aforementioned concept was undertaken 
through a case study completed in 2014 – which designed a 
model of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Fuel System 
[9]. 
 
3.1. The Fuel System 
 
The engine fuel system is a complex 
electromechanical system. A typical top level diagram of the 
fuel rig is shown in Figure 2. In addition to its main functions 
of storing fuel, feeding the engines with the required flow and 
pressure; it is used for other external applications like 
management of the centre of gravity of the plane and the wing 
loading relief. That is why the fuel flow into various different 
tanks (especially in the wing tanks) has to be managed 
efficiently and effectively. Any failure of the system has to be 
avoided to fulfil the safety requirements which result from a 
continuous feeding of the engines throughout the flight. It is 
usually composed of four mains types of components: the fuel 
tanks, pumps, sensors and valves.  In the presented 
architecture, left/right pumps will supply fuel to their 
respective engines, but there is also the option to cross feed 
fuel in between tanks. The purpose of the auxiliary tanks is to 
add redundancy in the system. 
 
Recalling the requirement presented in Section 2: isolate 
engine fuel system failure to one LRU. The one in this data 
requirement indicates a specific number of LRUs. Whether 
the information about the fuel system (presented above) is 
Figure 2: Top level design of a fuel system 
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sufficient for determining the general health of critical 
functions, the requirement can be further broken down to help 
clarify which fault symptoms are the engineering departments 
and OEM interested in for their investigations. This task can 
be completed by carrying out a well know concept found 
within fault analysis strategies i.e. a Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). Furthermore, a FMEA can be 
simplified by concentrating on particular areas of the system, 
and isolate them down to one component. For example, 
consider the following five failure symptoms in the system: 
x No flow 
x Restricted flow  
x Loss of fuel  
x Low pressure 
x High pressure 
 
The end result from such an analysis can depict the 
FMEA as in the Table below: 
 Table 1. FMEA example. 
Component Failure Effect Symptom 
Pump No power No flow 
Restricted flow 
Low pressure 






















A no flow and restricted fuel flow can be indicated by 
correlating the captured flow (by using the installed sensors 
and the expected fuel flow). Likewise, any loss of fuel within 
the system can be picked up by correlating any variations in 
the fuel levels against the fuel flowing. Any changes here can 
be used to identify a loss of fuel from the system. Such 
analysis makes use of existing sensors.   However, the 
exercise reveals that the present setup can help a maintenance 
engineer by indicating the loss of fuel and high pressure down 
to one component in the event of a split seal and broken pipe, 
respectively, but will not be able to distinguish amongst the 
outstanding three components – in case any one of them fails. 
In maintenance terms, this is also known as ambiguity, which 
is a collection of failure mechanisms for which diagnostics 
can detect a fault and even isolate it to a group of components, 
yet cannot further isolate the fault to any subset of the group. 
Therefore, some extra work will be needed at depth 
maintenance to investigate and isolate the reported unit, 
otherwise up to three potentially serviceable units can be 
substituted in an effort to reduce costs, down time and 
maintain availability. The financial implication comes down 
to the fact that two of the three components (that may have 
Figure 3: Strategy to decide on new sensor locations 
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been removed) will have no faults – the NFF phenomena. In 
order to increase isolation, new sensors are required.   This is 
a simplified presentation of the problem in the real world, 
where the locations of the sensors seem to make all the 
difference in the isolation of faults. The number of NFF 
events can be reduced by focusing on reducing large 
components groups (higher ambiguities) and components that 
have a lower reliability. This will separate the lower reliability 
items out of ambiguity groups. This diagnostic study will 
entail a trade-off between the ambiguity and the criticality of 
the large component groups. Instead of reducing the fault 
groups with the highest ambiguity, the criticality of the groups 
must also influence decision-making. After identifying the 
essential components, new sensors are selected and added 
accordingly.  
 
What are ambiguity groups? 
Ambiguity groups are a collection of failure mechanisms for 
which diagnostics can detect a fault and can isolate the fault to 
that collection. However, there is no mechanism to further 
isolate the fault to any subset of the collection. E.g. for a 
system to have an ambiguity group of 10 indicated that the 
fault can be isolated to 10 components after which the 
maintainer will need to use his experience to make a 
judgement and conclude the most likely faulty component. In 
the ideal situation, ambiguity groups should be one as it 
indicates that a fault can be isolated to just one component – 
in effect, reducing NFF.  
Figure 3 points towards a strategy being developed to 
reduce the ambiguity group size to one, by making use of new 
sensor locations in an existing design. The aim is for the 
exercise is to provide revised diagnostic statistics, which can 
be compared with the reference (or targeted) results. 
 
However, the strategy has been built on the requirement of 
isolating system failures to one component. Component 
groups with highest ambiguity do not always have the highest 
criticality. There is still work to be completed on the strategy 
of the fault group selection according to the ambiguity or the 
criticality. For example, selecting between a fault group with 
an ambiguity of fifteen and a criticality smaller than the one 
of a fault group with an ambiguity of fourteen and thirteen is 
quite complex. Studying this trade-off could improve the 
sensors placement and decrease the average ambiguity of the 
design. 
 
3.2 Use of Design Software 
 
For Fault Identification and Isolation (FDI) during 
operations and maintenance, there are several software tools 
available for system design. Each tool is different in terms of 
techniques and methods for system representation and 
diagnostic development. In order to achieve diagnostic 
success, the design analysis tool should enable studying the 
diagnostic ambiguity and help optimise test regimes for 
Figure 4: The fuel system model designed in eXpressTM 
Figure 4: Design of the initial fuel system model with eXpressTM 
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accuracy/sensitivity. eXpressTM is: “a fully-featured, off-the-
shelf software application providing an environment for the 
design, capture, integration, evaluation and optimization of 
System Diagnostics, Prognostics Health Management, and 
holistic Systems Testability engineering” [9]. Such testability 
software can also offer the possibility to provide a diagnostic 
analysis and a Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA). However, design changes can often be carried out 
with little information about the type of sensors and the 
additional effort required for sensor placement. The proposed 
improvements in design are by adding new sensors. 
Therefore, before reaching to any conclusions, it is important 
to take into account such costs. The obsolescence of the 
component and their cost inflation can be considered, and can 
heavily influence design decisions. An initial design of the 
fuel rig model is illustrated in Figure 4 (please note that 
component icons and their functionality is not explained in 
this paper due to length limitations. Please see Alexandre 
(2014) for more information [9]). 
 
 
A note on limitations – Software simulations can help 
describes many metrics. Some can be based upon typical 
design assessment requirements while others can be more 
advanced design requirements for assessing future health 
management requirements. The graphs produced by 
eXpressTM for example, can describe the increase in risk of 
any failure (or the combination of failures), since the last time 
it was diagnosed - considering the impact of maintenance. 
Surprisingly, this consideration has not been found in any 
academic literature by the author on the embodiment of the 
topic. Instead, one must effectively bury the likelihood of 
uncertainty in the use of distributions. Yet, if that is a 
preference, one can even use any distribution curve of choice 
as an attribute assigned to any failure effect “test” used in 
their design. If design engineers can glance at the 
characteristics (or trends) presented in quick (gestalt) graphs 
to “visualise” the impact of design-decision modifications, 
then it is possible to understand their impact - originating 
from the same identical knowledgebase where all of the 
component interrelationships are captured, and in a form 
enabling optimisation “whole design model swapping”. 
4. Ongoing work and Conclusions 
The concept discussed in this paper is being researched 
with a larger NFF related study that incorporates various 
stakeholders requirements. Even though the NFF research 
described in this paper has been limited in scope and was 
mentioned only to aid clarity. To paper highlights that it is 
useful to classify information for stakeholders and their 
requirements in different categories/layers. Considering the 
visual, transitional and hardware aspects within one design 
process, the idea helps with understanding the problem from a 
design engineer’s perspective to enable more knowledgeable 
and integrated decisions. Also, a stakeholder’s data 
requirement could be correlated down to feedback sensors.   
The ongoing work extends to investigate trade-offs in 
system design attributes – factors such as cost, size and 
weight must be considered with designing the system for 
maintenance. Other characteristics, such as system reliability 
and data analytics, are more complex and will require 
software tools to evaluate the requirements. Studying this 
trade-off could improve the sensors placement and decrease 
the average ambiguity of the design. 
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